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EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES 
The plea in the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
I.The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Indi­
vidual Freedoms was signed in Rome on the 41h.November 1950, but came
into force only three years later, on 3rct. September 1953. It set out a procedure
which could be made use of by those persons who alleged that they were the
victims of violations of their fundamental rights and freedoms, by any one of
the High Contracting Parties of the Convention.The procedure could be initi­
ated by a petition addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
and lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights. The Commis­
sion could then deal with the matter mentioned in the petition.
2. Before proceeding further with its examination however, the Commission
had to establish, if so required by the respondent State, whether the applicant
or petitioner, had exhausted the remedies which were available according to
the domestic legal order:-
"The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies 
have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of interna­
tional law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final 
decision was taken" 
This was Article 26 which now, as from ! 51 • November 1998, appears as Arti­
cle 35; the word 'Court' has now replaced the word 'Commission'. 
What follows are some considerations on how, that part of the article which 
states: 
" after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the gen-
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eral recognized rules of international law" 
has been interpreted and applied by the European Court of Human Rights. 
Points of Procedure. 
3. Before proceeding with the examination of the interpretation of the exhaustion rule 
arrived at by the Court, it is perhaps necessary to note three procedural points, con­
nected with the application of the plea, which to any ordinary advocate who is also a
practitioner in Courts of Law, would have been taken foregranted. Not so in the
Strasbourg experience. In the initial cases debated before the Commission various
doubts were raised and it took some time to arrive at the following usual settlement of
the difficulties. These three points are [i] that it is up to the State to raise the plea that
the applicant has not exhausted all the domestic remedies which were at his disposal
according to that State's National Legal Structure; [ii] that once the plea is raised it is 
incumbent on that State to prove what it alleges; [iii] the applicant has, finally, the
burden to prove otherwise, after the State has succeeded to prove its plea.
The scope of the rule. 
4. It is clear that the best and ideal position which the Rule of Law tends to
achieve, is that fundamental rights and freedoms are respected, protected and
enforced in every State at the national, or as it is called, the domestic, level. It
is only when this somehow fails that the need arises to have recourse to an
international tribunal to correct the deficiency.
The Convention therefore, in conformity with this principle encourages its 
member States to settle all matters which may arise regarding fundamental 
rights and freedoms within the ambit of their own legal order and will only 
exercise its jurisdiction, if and when that national legal order does not come 
up with an adequate answer. Hence the importance of Article 35 for under­
standing the basic philosophy underlying the comprehensive and systematic 
thinking and practice on this aspect of the Rule of Law which has now, since 
the end of the Second World War [ 1939-1945], flourished and spread, at least, 
in most parts of the Western part of the World. 
5. These aims of this important rule, which bring out the basic general think­
ing upon which it is based, have been expressed in various judgments of the
Court. The following are some of the most salient expressions:-
" The rule of domestic remedies, which dispenses States from answering be-
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fore an international body for their acts before an international body before 
they have an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, 
is also one of the generally recognized principles of international law to which 
Article 26 [now 35] makes specific reference"', and further down in the same 
judgment:-
" .. the essential aim of which [i.e. the rule] is to protect the national legal order"2 
6. The purpose of this short study is very limited. The rule has been considered by
a substantial number of judgments of the Court. The conclusions arrived at vary
considerably. It is difficult to state that there is in fact a definite jurisprudential line
which can be said to have been really established by the Court; except perhaps to
say that on the whole, an overview will come down to the proposition that 'the
protection of the national legal order' does not seem to have had from the Court
the expected and due recognition which was laid down by the Convention.
7. It is not often that the Court, has in fact, found in favour of a State's plea
that domestic remedies had not been exhausted by the applicant before re­
course was had to the Strasbourg Organs. It is therefore instructive to examine
in some detail 3, one of the earliest examples of a judgment4 which accepted
the plea raised by a State of non-exhaustion of domestic legal remedies by the
applicant. Few others followed it and it served as an opportunity for the Court
in Plenary Session to explain how it understands the rule when it concludes in
favour of the acceptance of the plea. It is instructive because it is exactly in
this positive, in the sense of acceptance of the plea, judgment which demon­
strates, more than any one of the numerous negative judgments, how the Court
through its interpretation of the article has weakened it to such an extent that
sometimes one gets the impression that, in truth, the Court has forgotten that it
is also incumbent upon it to look favourably upon all those national domestic
legal structures which do provide remedies when fundamental rights and
liberties are violated. His weakening of the rule reaches very dangerous levels
in certain cases as shall be commented upon in the second part of this short
study.
8. Danielle Van Oosterwijck was born in Belgium and registered as a child of
the female sex. Very early in life she became conscious of a dual personality;
although physically female she felt herself psychologically of the male sex.
Specialist doctors found symptoms which indicated trans-sexualism. Hormone
therapy was accepted and applied which brought about changes in hair growth
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and change of voice. From 1970 to 1973, in measured stages, surgical inter­
ventions- bilateral mammectomy, hysterectomy, bilateral ovariectomy and 
phalloplasty, - substituted a female to a male physique. Only the chromo­
somes of the female type remained. 
9. On completion of this painful and stressing process, Van Oosterwijck filed
a petition to have the birth certificate 'rectified' so that that certificate should
henceforth read ' a child of the male sex with the forenames of Daniel,
Julien ... son of. .. '
Belgian Law, like ours, permitted an action for correcting a birth certificate if 
an error was detected and proved. Any other registered certificate, marriage, 
death etc. was similarly treated. In the instant case, the Brussels Court dis­
missed the action as no error was demonstrated. The Court of Appeal con­
firmed the first decision and Van Oosterwijck decided not to have recourse to 
the Court of Cassation. The decision of the Court of Appeal was delivered on 
7 May 1974, and shortly afterwards, on 2 July 1974, a new law came into 
force which permitted a person to seek an authorization to have his forenames 
changed for the purposes of having them on his identity card together with a 
photograph of the person's actual physical appearance. 
10. On 1 September 1976 Van Oosterwijck applied to the Commission alleg­
ing that the refusal of the Belgian State had brought about his 'civil death', an
inhuman and degrading treatment [ art.3]; was obliging him to use documents
which did not reflect his true identity [art. 8 respect for private life]; perpetu­
ating a distortion which eliminated the right to marry and to establish a family
[art.12].
11. The Commission dismissed the Government's plea that the applicant had
not exhausted all the domestic remedies available, but the plea was raised
once again before the Chamber of the Court, which because of the importance
of case relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Plenary Court which on 27
February 1980 accepted the plea and thereby referred the applicant back to the
domestic legal order.
12. The Government pleaded that a] no appeal on a point of law had been made
to the Court of Cassation; b] the convention itself was not pleaded either in first
or second instance; c] no application under the new law had been made for
authorization to change forenames, and lastly, d] the applicant did not institute
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an' action d'etat' which is a special action pertaining to personal status. 
13. In reaching its decision, which is the first judgment in which the Court
examined in some detail the implications of art. 35 [previous 26], the follow­
ing points were considered and established:-
[A] "The only remedies which . .. the Convention requires to be exercised are
those that relate to the breaches alleged and at the same time are available and
sufficient . "
{ i} as to the first part of this statement 'In order to determine whether a rem­
edy satisfies these various conditions and is on that account to be regarded as
likely to provide redress ..... the Court does not have to assess whether those 
complaints are well-founded: it must assume this to be so, but on a strictly 
provisional basis and purely as a working hypothesis'; 
{ii} as to the second part - remedies which are 'available and sufficient', the
Court refereed back to dicta in previous judgments, beginning with that of the
Stogmuller Case5 of 1969. Reference to what was said in this latter case,
began with the Vagrancy Cases of 18 June 1970,6 already mentioned, and
continued with the Airey Case of 9 Oct. 1979 7 and the Deweer Case of Feb.
1980 8, and it is therefore useful to quote it in full :-
"As to the point whether the proceedings instituted { saisine} may embrace 
complaints concerning facts which occurred after the lodging of the Applica­
tion, international law, to which Article 26 refers explicitly, is far from confer­
ring on the rule of exhaustion the inflexible character which the Government 
seem to attribute to it. International Law only imposes the use of the remedies 
which are not only available to the persons concerned but are also sufficient, 
that is to say capable of redressing their complaints."9 [B]. the recourse to the 
Court of Cassation should have been made because that Court has jurisdiction 
' to state the law and thereby set the course for subsequent judicial decisions. 
There is nothing to show that an appeal to the Court of Cassation on grounds 
of the national legislation stricto sensu would have been obviously futile. 10' 
[C] since the Convention forms part of the Belgian legal system, the applicant
could have relied on Article 8 and this in his own country. 11 
[D] the actions d'etat deal with issues of substance as their purpose 'is to
establish, modify or extinguish personal status 12'; however in this context the
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Court held that :-
" The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is neither absolute nor capable 
of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether the rule has been ob­
served, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of the 
case." 
Accordingly the Court concluded, on this point, that 'in the absence of any 
decided cases in Belgium' on actions of this type, the applicant was not ex­
pected to be at fault for omitting to institute such an action . 
14. One can summarize therefore the points of interpretation given by the
Court as follows:-
[a] the domestic remedies claimed by the defending State have to be available
and sufficient.
This 'interpretation' borders on the obvious and the tautological. Manifestly a
State cannot raise the plea without having within its own legal structure rem­
edies which can not only potentially but also actually, resolve the violations
alleged by the applicant if these are proved to have occurred. It is to be re­
called that this 'available and sufficient' formulation, was used initially by the
Court in the Stogmuller Case in answer to the preposterous pretension by the
State that the applicant was obliged to make use of remedies provided by the
State after he had recourse to the international organs. Obviously not; and
therefore an obvious rejection by the Court. But as time went by the state­
ment came to shed its 'textual' meaning, and became a sort of password which
through sheer repetition, as a general ground-cover, sometimes being so 'ob­
vious', to come dangerously close to disarming the rule. As shall latter be
illustrated.
[b] The plea by the State will not succeed if the remedy which was supposedly
at the applicant's disposition, would have been obviously futile when attempted.
[ c] The rule is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically:
and therefore it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of
each case.
These three modes of interpretation have been followed uninterruptedly up to 
now [ie.the end of 1998] by the Court and in certain cases, as shall be seen, 
they have been applied in such a way that one can really consider that the 
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protection of the national legal order essentiality of the rule has suffered se­
vere obfuscation. 
15. The second part of this study will discuss some interesting and controver­
sial cases in which the Court rejected the plea of exhaustion of domestic rem­
edies.
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